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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most distinguishing trends in United States (“U.S.”)
litigation has been the expansion of class-action securities lawsuits and
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) enforcement actions
against U.S.-listed Chinese companies who have gone public through a
state reverse merger process in the U.S.1 Investors in the U.S. have
risked billions of dollars on these Chinese companies, principally under
a belief that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) protected them
against accounting fraud and inaccurate or inflated stock prices.2
However, once accounting scandal concerns become ostensible, stock
prices collapse,3 and U.S. investors are financially devastated, including
some major investors such as John Paulson and former American
International Group, Inc. (AIG) CEO Maurice Greenberg.4 Regrettably,
these embattled shareholders and the SEC have little to no recourse or
enforcement capacity where gaps in SOX, state reverse merger law, and
a lack of international reciprocity allow Chinese and other foreign
corporations to exploit U.S. investors.5 The federal government and state
legislatures must take drastic measures to ensure investor confidence in
international corporations listed on U.S. exchanges, and to protect U.S.
investors from investing in corporations mired in fraudulent activity.
Such measures may include imposing additional requirements on reverse
mergers involving foreign companies, so that the SEC may potentially
freeze foreign assets, or imposing significant diplomatic pressure on
China.

1. Kevin M. LaCroix, Esq., Surge of Securities Litigation Against U.S.-Listed
Chinese Companies Raises Critical D&O Insurance Issues, PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW
PITTMAN LLP (July 14, 2011) http://www.pillsburylaw.com/publications/surge-of-securitieslitigation-against-us-listed-chinese-companies-raises-critical-dandampo-insurance-issues.
2. Dena Aubin & Andrew Shalal-Esa, Where Was SEC as Trouble Festered at
Chinese Companies?, REUTERS, July 10, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07
/10/us-china-accounting-enforcement-idUSTRE7692I820110710.
3. Clare Baldwin & Dena Aubin, Audit Watchdog Chief Sees 2012 China Deal,
REUTERS, July 8, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/08/us-pcaob-doty-idUST
RE76754Z20110708.
4. Aubin & Shalal-Esa, supra note 2.
5. Id.
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Appreciably, various groups, including the SEC, have taken a number
of steps to address and confront the issue head-on.6 The SEC has issued
an Investor Bulletin to educate U.S. investors on the perils of investing
in foreign corporations accessing U.S. capital markets through the
reverse merger process.7 In addition, the SEC has brought many actions
suspending trading or revoking registration of these China-based
corporations.8 Furthermore, the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board, set up under Sarbanes-Oxley to examine accounting fraud, issued
a report examining China-based companies, reverse mergers, and potential
audit implications.9 In that report, the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board identified 159 Chinese companies that have accessed
U.S. securities exchanges through reverse mergers, and noted the principal
concern that U.S. firms are not conducting thorough, proper audits of
these companies, and that Chinese accounting firms may be inaccurate
in their assessments.10 Moreover, Moody’s credit rating agency issued a
“Red Flags” report for these companies to focus on investors’ concerns
with their financial reporting,11 and NASDAQ has proposed new, more
stringent listing requirements for companies that go public through
reverse mergers.12 These proposed requirements are currently under
review for comment.13

6. See Anjali C. Das, Claims Against China-Based Reverse Merger Companies:
A Tempest in a Teapot of Gunpowder or Green Tea?, WILSON ELSER MOSKOWITZ
EDELMAN & DICKER LLP (July 2011) http://www.wilsonelser.com/news_and_insights
/client_alerts/649-claims_against_china-based_reverse_merger_companies.
7. See Securities & Exchange Commission, Investor Bulletin Reverse Mergers
(June 9, 2011).
8. Aubin & Shalal-Esa, supra note 2.
9. See generally Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, Research Note
#2011-P1: Activity Summary of Audit Implications for Reverse Mergers Involving
Companies from the China Region—January 1, 2007, through March 31, 2010 (Mar. 14,
2011).
10. Id.
11. See generally Moody’s Investors Service, Special Comment: Red Flags for
Emerging-Market Companies—A Focus on China (July 11, 2011).
12. See Securities & Exchange Commission, Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule
Change to Adopt Additional Listing Requirements for Reverse Mergers, SEC Release
No. 24-64633, at 1–3 (June 8, 2011). Requirements listed are as follows: (1) traded for
at least six months in the U.S. over-the-counter market, on another national securities
exchange or on a foreign exchange following the filing of all audited financial statements;
(2) maintained a bid price of $4 or more per share for at least 30 of the most recent 60
trading days; (3) in the case of a U.S. domestic issuer, the company timely filed its two
most recent financial statements (i.e., Form 10-Q or 10-K); and (4) in the case of a
foreign-based issuer, the company timely filed a comparable financial statement (i.e., Form 6-
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However, these superficial notices, actions, and reporting requirements
lack the authoritative weight necessary to stem a burgeoning issue of this
magnitude. The SEC itself has about 350 people in its corporation
finance division reviewing over 10,000 public companies’ financial reports,
and has significant resource constraints that would allow it to find every
single reverse merger accounting issue.14 And while the SEC may
charge China-based companies with fraudulent activity and ultimately
win,15 Chinese courts do not enforce U.S. judgments,16 and the SEC may
not have the means to obtain the awarded assets.17 Moreover, the lack of
an extradition treaty between the U.S. and China allows Chinese managers
to evade criminal conviction based on accounting fraud in SOX.18
Furthermore, China’s trade secrets laws prevent the gathering of accounting
evidence and work papers essential to this type of litigation.19 Finally,
because state law governs the reverse merger process to permit Chinabased corporations access to U.S. exchanges, it is difficult for the federal
government to stop Chinese companies from the outset.20
This article seeks to provide a roadmap for the U.S. federal and state
legislatures to come together to protect the U.S. investor from the type of
accounting fraud and stock misinformation that was the impetus behind
enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. First, this article will discuss
the legal backdrop and legislative policy behind U.S. laws such as SOX
and its enforcement mechanisms, and the ability for shareholders to
bring securities class action derivative actions for financial fraud. This
article will also discuss trade secrets laws, criminal extradition treaties,
international enforcement of judgments, and elucidate the reverse merger

K, 20-F or 40-F) that includes an interim balance sheet and an income statement presented
“in English.” Id.
13. See Securities & Exchange Commission, Order Instituting Proceedings to
Determine Whether to Disapprove Proposed Rule Change to Adopt Additional Listing
Requirements for Reverse Mergers, SEC Release No. 34-65319, at 1 (Sept. 12, 2011).
14. Aubin & Shalal-Esa, supra note 2.
15. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. China Energy Sav. Tech., 636 F. Supp. 2d
199 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (ordering China Energy Savings Technology Inc. to pay $34
million judgment for stock manipulation).
16. “First, reciprocity does not in fact appear to exist. My research has failed to
uncover a single case in which U.S. courts have enforced Chinese court judgments without
inquiring into the underlying merits of the dispute. Second, Chinese courts do not believe
that reciprocity exists sufficient to support the enforcement of a U.S. court judgment.
My research has found no cases in which a U.S. court judgment has been enforced on
any grounds.” See Donald C. Clarke, The Enforcement of United States Court Judgments
in China: A Research Note, Geo. Wash. Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 236, at
3 (May 27, 2004).
17. Aubin & Shalal-Esa, supra note 2.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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process in the states, particularly in Delaware. Second, this article will
illustrate just how these Chinese corporations exploit the current state of
the law and diplomatic relations with the United States to unfairly
manipulate U.S. investors. Finally, this article will provide two
complementary solutions to pave the way to achieving international
commercial accountability, by a protectionist scheme involving both the
federal government and state legislatures and by international diplomacy
and legal pressure.
II. BACKGROUND
Before addressing the principal issue of China-based corporations
entering U.S. capital markets without fear of conviction with respect to
their fraudulent activity, the current state of relevant U.S. law and
international relations must be fully demonstrated. The U.S. has enacted
laws to protect its citizens and provide a cause of action against corporate
fraud, felt the effect of trade secrets laws as a hindrance to discovery in
international cases, seen the benefit of criminal extradition treaties,
appreciated the effect of non-enforcement of its judgments, and
developed a reverse merger process in its state legislatures that is being
exploited. After fully illuminating the state of the law in each of these
five areas, this article will move to the principal issue of how Chinabased corporations use U.S. state law to fraudulently capitalize on
investors, and how to effectively stymie exploitation of U.S. law and
diplomacy by Chinese corporations.
A. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
Significantly, the impetus behind the implementation of SOX is the
same policy reasoning behind protecting U.S. investors from Chinabased accounting fraud in the U.S. today. When President Bush signed
into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,21 it was in the wake of acrossthe-board corporate accounting fraud, reduction in shareholders’ equity
in Enron Corporation of about 1.2 billion, and the collapse of
WorldCom.22 This economic collapse had been preceded by financial
reporting irregularities at a number of other public corporations including
Oxford Health and Xerox, and investor confidence in U.S. capital markets
21.
22.

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT IN PERSPECTIVE § 1:1 (2010).
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was shattered.23 In an interview with Senator Paul Sarbanes, co-author
of SOX, Sen. Sarbanes described the inspiration behind the Act as a
result of “problems that were broad, deep systemic and structural” in the
marketplace and a result of “highly-regarded public companies, along
with their auditors . . . relying upon convoluted and often fraudulent
accounting devices to inflate earnings, hide losses, and drive up stock
prices.”24 Widespread accounting fraud led to a destruction of investor
confidence in publicly-traded corporations and a decline in U.S. security
prices. The implementation of SOX was precisely to assure reliability
of corporate disclosure and accounting standards that ensure economic
buoyancy.25
Under Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC has the capacity to regulate
accounting standards and engage in litigation to protect against fraud or
misrepresentation on its own initiative.26 In addition, SOX establishes
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to oversee audit
reports of companies subject to securities laws.27 Furthermore, SOX
establishes a number of regulatory provisions to safeguard against
accounting fraud.28 Of critical importance is the section on corporate
responsibility for financial reports, which requires officers to assure the
public that their financial statements are accurate.29 Both the CEO and
the CFO must certify in each annual and quarterly report that they have
reviewed their financial report, that it is true to the best of their
knowledge, and that it reflects the financial status of the company; if the
information is incorrect or inaccurate, the officers are subject to personal
liability.30 This monetary liability can range up to $5 million with an
additional criminal liability of up to twenty years in prison for corporate
directors.31 Notably, criminal liability has acted as a major deterrent for
U.S. capital market accounting fraud and misrepresentation.32

23. Id.
24. Interview by Nance Lucas with Paul S. Sarbanes, U.S. Senator (Jan. 1, 2004),
available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0NXD/is_1_11/ai_n25101748/.
25. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 22.
26. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C, § 7202 (2011).
27. Id. § 7211 (2011).
28. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 22, at § 1:10.
29. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2010).
30. See id.
31. Matt A. Vega, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Culture of Bribery: Expanding
the Scope of Private Whistleblower Suits to Overseas Employees, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
425, 439 (2009).
32. Aubin & Shalal-Esa, supra note 2.
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B. Private Litigation
Accordingly, disclosure of financial statements and accounting
irregularities from SOX has also led to shareholders filing private actions,
which may result in larger judgments and settlements.33 However,
victimized shareholders have been authorized to file suit against publicly
held corporations on the basis of securities fraud since the implementation
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.34 The SEC promulgated a
landmark regulation under the Act, which provides that it is unlawful for
any person to engage in any scheme or artifice to defraud, or make any
misrepresentation of material fact, in the connection of its purchase or
sale of its own securities.35 Significantly, in order for shareholders to
have a successful fraud claim under this section, the Supreme Court has
proffered six elements that plaintiffs must prove in litigation, citing a
number of influential cases, statutes, and treatises in the process.36 In
cases involving publicly traded securities, a shareholder fraud action
must include: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission; (2) a wrongful
state of mind; (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security;
(4) reliance by plaintiffs on material misrepresentation; (5) economic
loss; and (6) loss causation, or a causal connection between the material
misrepresentation and the loss.37
In recent years, it has become exceedingly difficult for shareholders to
bring derivative fraud claims.38 As with any cause of action, in a
securities fraud action under Section10(b), the plaintiffs must plead a
claim on which relief can be granted in order to survive a FRCP 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss.39 In 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”), 40 which established pleading

33. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 22, at § 1:19.
34. See Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2011).
35. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
36. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (citing Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4); THOMAS
LEE HAZEN, 4 LAW. SEC. REG. §§ 12.11[1], [3] (5th ed. 2005)).
37. Id. at 341–42.
38. See generally Jonathan C. Dickey, Current Trends in Federal Securities Litigation,
1620 PLI/CORP 339 (2007).
39. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
40. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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requirements for these actions, which notably contained a higher
requirement for proving scienter, or a wrongful state of mind.41 Under
the PSLRA, the plaintiffs must “state with particularity facts giving rise
to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind.”42 Recently, the Supreme Court in Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v.
Tellabs, Inc. held that this “strong inference” must be at least as strong
as an opposing inference on the pleadings.43 The plaintiffs must allege
facts from which a reasonable person could rationally draw an inference
of scienter.44 Accordingly, as Jonathan C. Dickey notes in the Corporate
Law and Practice Series, “Tellabs strengthens the pleading standard set
forth by Congress in the PSLRA, and creates a uniformly high bar for
pleading . . . in securities fraud cases.”45 Thus, in the context of foreign
corporate directors, shareholders must have access to detailed facts
against a foreign corporation at the pleading stage before the discovery
process may begin in order to withstand preliminary motions to dismiss.
C. U.S. Jurisdiction over Foreign Defendants under SOX and the
Securities Exchange Act
Significantly, U.S. courts can claim a broad swath of jurisdiction over
foreign defendants for violations of these federal laws.46 In determining
whether a court can exercise personal jurisdiction, a court must look to
the contacts between the defendant and the litigation.47 In assessing the
sufficiency of the contacts, a court should determine whether the
defendant has availed himself of the privileges of American law and the
extent to which he could reasonably anticipate being involved in
litigation in the United States.”48 The court also must determine whether
the exercise of such jurisdiction comports with “traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.”49
Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act authorizes a nationwide
service of process for claims under the act,50 and this entails a “nationwide

41.
Tellabs,
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
1985)).
49.
50.
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Marvin Lowenthal, Revitalizing Motive and Opportunity Pleading After
109 MICH. L. REV. 625, 628 (2011).
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2011).
Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 323.
Id.
Dickey, supra note 38, at 374.
See In re Heckmann Corp. Sec. Litig., 869 F. Supp. 2d 519, 535–36 (D. Del. 2012).
Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002).
Id. at 370 (quoting Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 293 (3d Cir.
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2011).
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contacts analysis” by the federal courts.51 Under a nationwide contacts
analysis, the jurisdiction is not confined to where the federal court
resides, but rather the whole of the U.S.52 A nationwide contacts analysis
also passes muster under the U.S. Constitution and due process concerns
in federal court for federal question cases.53 Accordingly, foreign corporate
defendants satisfy the minimum contacts test under this analysis, and
they may be brought within the purview of U.S. federal courts under
federal law.54
D. Trade Secrets Laws
For both SEC and private litigants, enforcement of trade secret
restrictions make it difficult to obtain the financial statements and facts
necessary to properly allege and prevail on claims under SOX or the
Securities Exchange Act.55 National state secrets laws can have chilling
effects on transparency for business and trade, and businesses may be
unable to predict sanctions or criminal convictions based on their activity.56
Accordingly, in foreign litigation, businesses may not hand over records
in discovery if they could be subject to their own national jurisdiction’s
state secrets laws.57 This could render Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which provides the ability to compel disclosure or
discovery in federal court,58 without force or halt litigation at the pleading
stage.
The U.S and its administrative agencies have faced this type of hurdle
in international litigation before.59 In an enormous tax-evasion inquiry
by the U.S. and the IRS against UBS, a Swiss bank, the federal government
sued for the disclosure of 52,000 account holders’ identities.60 UBS stated
that complying with this disclosure demand would violate Swiss law,

51. Snowstorm Acquisition Corp. v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 739 F. Supp. 2d 686, 699
(D. Del. 2010).
52. In re Heckmann, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 535.
53. Snowstorm, 739 F. Supp. 2d at 700.
54. See In re Heckmann, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 536.
55. See Aubin & Shalal-Esa, supra note 2.
56. See generally Sigrid Ursula Jernudd, China, State Secrets, and the Case of Xue
Feng: The Implication for International Trade, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 309 (2011).
57. Aubin & Shalal-Esa, supra note 2.
58. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a).
59. See Carrick Mollenkamp, UBS Customers Shielded by Swiss Law, Bank Says,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2009.
60. Id.
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and also that there was no tax treaty negotiated between the two
countries.61 While high-level government officials in that case came
together to settle,62 Swiss courts later ruled that its financial regulator
broke the law in ordering UBS to transmit tax data to the U.S.63 This
promised to negatively influence future international litigation,64 and
Swiss lawmakers later rejected disclosure to the U.S. Justice Department
in a further criminal investigation into UBS.65 While the IRS later
dropped the action against UBS,66 trade secrets laws, such as Swiss
banking law, have proven troublesome to the enforcement of laws by
U.S. administrative agencies, such as the Internal Revenue Service.
E. Criminal Extradition Treaties
In the event that the SEC or shareholders overcome these litigation
hurdles and convict foreign directors for accounting fraud, the lack of a
criminal extradition treaty may render the U.S. helpless in enforcing
judgments against foreign directors. Under U.S. law, when there is a
treaty for extradition between the U.S. and a foreign government, any
justice or judge may issue a warrant for the apprehension of a person
charged with a crime in his or her jurisdiction.67 The judicial and
executive branches must follow a strict three-step process in determining
whether to sustain a criminal charge.68 However, a lack of an extradition
treaty means a fugitive who flees the U.S. may evade capture and avoid
criminal charges, and the U.S. must wait until the individual is arrested

61. Id.
62. Lynnley Browning, U.S. Reports Agreement with UBS in Tax Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 13, 2009, at B3.
63. Chris V. Nicholson, Swiss Court Says Regulator Broke the Law in UBS Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2010, at B2.
64. Id.
65. Lynnley Browning, Switzerland Rejects Deal to Share Banking Data, N.Y.
TIMES, June 8, 2010, at B3.
66. Laura Saunders, IRS Withdraws its UBS Tax Case, Closing a Chapter, U.S.
Taxpayers’ Names Handed Over; More Actions to Come, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2010.
67. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2011).
68. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-96 (2011). See also Anna MacCormack, The United States,
China, and Extradition: Ready for the Next Step?, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 445,
449 (2009) (describing the three-step process as follows: “(1) extradition requests are
conveyed to the State Department, which reviews the request to ensure that it includes
sufficient evidence regarding the requested individual and alleged wrongdoing; (2) the
request is passed to the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the jurisdiction where the person
sought is believed to be, and the Office files a complaint in federal district court; a
judicial officer may then issue the arrest warrant for the person sought; and (3) once the
extraditee is apprehended, the judge conducts a hearing to determine whether there is a
valid treaty in operation, the crime is extraditable under the treaty, and probable cause
exists to sustain the charge”).
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in a cooperative jurisdiction.69 While there may be a case-by-case
informal avenue to extradition, without a treaty, cooperation between
countries is “unsystematic, improvised, and decentralized,” and there is
no way to check whether a country is abiding by its own laws or
international commitments.70 Consequently, with no extradition treaty,
obtaining a final criminal conviction is extremely difficult in U.S. courts.
With respect to SOX enforcement, the U.S. has appreciated the value
of an extradition treaty in its recent history.71 As a result of the Enron
debacle, three British citizens, dubbed the “NatWest Three” for their
involvement with NatWest Bank,72 were indicted by a grand jury in the
Southern District of Texas for wire fraud under SOX.73 Pursuant to the
extradition treaty in 2003 between the United Kingdom (“U.K.”) and the
U.S.,74 the three were transported to Houston, Texas to stand trial for
their criminal activity.75 This extradition request by the U.S, and
subsequent approval by the High Court in the U.K. in 2006,76 can serve
as a “successful model for prosecution of white collar crime.”77 Both the
U.K. and U.S. worked together to gather evidence and information
concerning the fraud in question,78 and by lowering standards for
extradition and working together with national legislation, transnational
prosecution has been significantly improved between the two nations.79

69. MacCormack, supra note 68, at 491.
70. Id. at 492.
71. See Kate Murphy, ‘NatWest 3’ Sentenced to 37 Months Each, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
22, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/business/worldbusiness/22iht-natwest.5.103
17714.html.
72. Id.
73. Indictment, United States v. Bermingham, No. H-02-0597 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
74. Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.S.U.K., Mar. 31, 2003, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-23 (2003).
75. NatWest ‘Fraud’ Trio Arrive in US, B.B.C. NEWS, July 13, 2006, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5175058.stm.
76. Alison E. Lardo, The 2003 Extradition Treaty Between the United States and
United Kingdom: Towards a Solution to Transnational White Collar Crime Prosecution?, 20
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 867, 894 (2006).
77. Id. at 893.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 903.
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F. Enforcement of U.S. Judgments
In the case of private litigation and some SEC enforcement, monetary
judgments, rather than criminal convictions, will be the remedy in securities
actions. Consequently, whether a foreign director’s home country enforces
U.S. judgments is a principal concern in protecting U.S. investors.
Presently, the United States is not a party to any treaty for reciprocal
recognition and enforcement of judgments.80 However, while the U.S. is
generally considered one of the most liberal and receptive nations in
recognizing foreign judgments,81 its size, its expansive notions of
jurisdiction, and its excessive jury verdicts are perceived as too imposing
for foreign nations to enforce consistently.82
Accordingly, recognition and enforcement of a U.S. monetary judgment
is naturally determined according to the foreign country’s enforcement
law.83 Foreign courts will typically enforce final judgments that are in
line with public policy.84 Foreign courts, such as Greece, Japan, and
Mexico, will often times refuse enforcement of a U.S. judgment if their
court would not have jurisdiction under the facts.85 Other foreign courts,
such as Korea, Spain, and Taiwan, will often times refuse enforcement
of a U.S. judgment if there was a failure to follow special notice
procedures.86 Further, foreign courts will, at times, view the U.S. federal
and state system as lacking uniformity, and deny enforcement on the
grounds “that U.S. courts will not reciprocally recognize and enforce
foreign judgments.” Consequently, U.S. monetary judgments are often
not upheld in foreign jurisdictions.87
80. Mark Moedritzer, Kay C. Whittaker & Ariel Ye, Judgments ‘Made in China’
but Enforceable in the United States?: Obtaining Recognition and Enforcement in the
United States of Monetary Judgments Entered in China Against U.S. Companies Doing
Business Abroad, 44 INT’L LAW. 817, 818 (2010).
81. Melinda Luthin, U.S. Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments and the Need
for Reform, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 111, 117 (2007).
82. See Matthew H. Adler, If We Build It, Will They Come?—The Need for
a Multilateral Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Monetary
Judgments, 26 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 79, 93–96 (1994).
83. Philip R. Weems, How to Enforce U.S. Money Judgments Abroad, TRIAL,
July 1988, at 72.
84. Adler, supra note 82, at 95.
85. Weems, supra note 83, at 74.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 94 n. 86 (citing as examples: Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger,
833 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1987) (Belgian labor dispute judgment); Ackermann v. Levine,
788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986) (German judgment for legal fees); Tahan v. Hodgson, 662
F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Israeli contract judgment); Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 612
F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1980) (Canadian guarantee contract judgment); Nat’l Union Fire Ins.
Co. of Pittsburgh v. People’s Republic of the Congo, 729 F. Supp. 936 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (British loan judgment); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Hoffman, 665 F. Supp.
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G. State Reverse Merger Law
Appreciably, after the discussion infra of SEC and private litigation
against foreign citizens and the general state of the law surrounding
enforcement of their potential judgments, it is imperative to discuss the
component of state law, which allows for foreign individuals and/or
corporations to infiltrate U.S. securities exchanges in the first place. A
“reverse merger” is a transaction, under state law,88 where a privately
held corporation acquires a publicly traded shell corporation.89 A shell
corporation is one with little or no assets and liabilities and is not in
operation.90 The shareholders of the privately held corporation then
exchange their shares for a majority of the shell corporation, gain a
controlling interest in voting power and shares, and take over business
operations.91 After the transaction, the private corporation will transform
into a publicly traded company, often with its same name, without going
through securities exchange registration and the initial stock offering.92
The crux of a reverse merger deal is the availability of a shell company
already listed on a U.S. stock exchange.93 Accordingly, private corporations
will contact “shell brokers” who acquire shell corporations in a “secrecyfriendly state such as Delaware, Utah or Nevada,”94 and these brokers
73 (D. Mass. 1987) (Belgian bankruptcy judgment); S.C. Nat’l Bank v. Westpac Banking
Corp., 678 F. Supp. 596 (D. S.C. 1987) (Australian letter of credit judgment); Parsons v.
Bank Leumi Le-Israel, B.M., 565 So. 2d 20 (Ala. 1990) (Israeli loan guarantee
judgment); Pan. Processes S.A. v. Cities Serv. Co., 796 P.2d 276 (Okla. 1990) (Brazilian
contract judgment); Bullen v. U.K., 553 So. 2d 1344 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (British
tax evasion judgment); Bank of Nova Scotia v. Tschabold Equip. Ltd., 754 P.2d 1290
(Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (Canadian bad check judgment); Laufer v. Westminster Brokers
Ltd., 532 A.2d 130 (D.C. 1987) (British brokerage contract judgment); Overseas Dev.
Bank in Liquidation v. Nothmann, 496 N.Y.S.2d 534 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (British money
judgment); Porisini v. Petricca, 456 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct. 1982)(British landlordtenant judgment); Mercandino v. Devoe & Raynolds, Inc., 436 A.2d 942 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1981) (Italian default judgment); Medical Arts Bldg. Ltd. v. Eralp, 290 N.W.2d 241
(N.D. 1980) (Canadian landlord-tenant judgment); Feuchter v. Bazurto, 528 P.2d 178
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1974) (Mexican bad check judgment)).
88. Nanette Byrnes & Lynnley Browning, Shell Games: A Reuters Investigation,
REUTERS, Aug. 1, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/01/us-shell-china-idUS
TRE7702S520110801.
89. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. M&A West, Inc., 538 F.3d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir.
2008).
90. Id.
91. Securities & Exchange Commission, Investor Bulletin, supra note 7.
92. M&A West, 538 F.3d at 1047.
93. Byrnes & Browning, supra note 88.
94. Id.
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will coordinate the transaction, prepare documentation, and act as conduits
for negotiation.95 Because these transactions are conducted under state
law, they often avoid oversight by federal SEC regulators and avoid
registration.96 While the private company avoids the initial public
offering,97 they still must comply with continuing listing requirements
once trading begins.98
Foreign corporations have been conducting these reverse mergers and
accessing U.S. securities markets.99 There are a number of reasons why
foreign private operating companies may pursue a reverse merger. First,
a reverse merger allows a private company cheap access to securities
exchanges, without the expense of a public offering.100 Second, private
companies can gain access to public investors, providing their firm with
more forms of equity.101 Third, they engender lower legal and accounting
fees than entering exchanges through an initial public offering.102 Openly,
reverse mergers are a great way for smaller companies, who can’t afford
a public offering, to access capital for their business.103 The issue lies in
the exploitative corporations who misuse it.104
Notably, the purpose of registration with the SEC is “to protect
investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary
to informed investment decisions.”105 When the express purpose of a
reverse merger is to access capital markets “without making the extensive
public disclosures required at the initial public offering,”106 it deprives
U.S. investors of particularly important protections.107 It is with this in
mind that the SEC promulgated an investor bulletin warning of investment
in reverse merger companies in 2011.108 The SEC warned investors that
foreign companies using reverse mergers might have questionable
financials, operations, and management.109 The SEC further warned that
investors should fully research these companies before making investment

95. See M&A West, 538 F.3d at 1047 (broker Medley assisted co-defendants with
transactions).
96. Byrnes & Browning, supra note 88.
97. M&A West, 538 F.3d at 1047.
98. Aubin & Shalal-Esa, supra note 2.
99. Securities & Exchange Commission, Investor Bulletin, supra note 7.
100. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Sierra Brokerage Servs., 608 F. Supp. 2d 923, 927
(S.D. Ohio 2009).
101. Securities & Exchange Commission, Investor Bulletin, supra note 7.
102. Id.
103. Byrnes & Browning, supra note 88.
104. Id.
105. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953).
106. M&A West, 538 F.3d at 1053.
107. See id.
108. See Securities & Exchange Commission, Investor Bulletin, supra note 7.
109. Id.
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decisions.110 Finally, the SEC added a consideration that foreign companies
have been using small auditing firms without resources to meet accounting
obligations required by the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board.111
III. ANALYSIS OF U.S.-LISTED, CHINA-BASED CORPORATIONS
Predictably, the SEC only had one foreign country in mind when it
promulgated the investor bulletin on reverse mergers: China.112 The
principal issue that has developed is that China-based corporations are
accessing U.S. securities and fraudulently capitalizing on U.S. investors
and U.S. law. As aptly stated by Republican Rep. Patrick McHenry, a
member of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
“it appears that some Chinese firms have seen a way to access the
strongest public markets in the world, but through the weakest area of
enforcement.”113 First, this section will offer a more detailed vision of
the current state of affairs. To follow is a roadmap-style analysis of the
U.S.-listed, China-based corporation from its inception under lax state
reverse merger laws, U.S. investor injection of equity, fraudulent activity
resulting in stock collapses, and finally to SEC and private litigation and
to problems faced in enforcement against the Chinese.
A. Current Situation and Increasing Litigation
Approximately thirty shareholder securities class action suits were
filed against U.S.-listed, China-based companies in the first half of 2011,
alleging securities fraud and violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 for derivative actions and false and misleading
financial statements.114 Lawsuits against Chinese reverse mergers amount
to near one-fourth of the ninety-four U.S. securities fraud class action
suits filed from January to June. 115 The SEC has recently stepped into
suspend trading in a number of reverse merger entities including:

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
See Das, supra note 6.
Byrnes & Browning, supra note 90.
Das, supra note 6.
Jonathan Stempel, RPT-More U.S. Lawsuits Target Chinese Reverse Mergers,
REUTERS, July 26, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/26/lawsuits-classactionstudy-idUSN1E76O20A20110726.
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(1) Heli Electronics Corp.; China Changjiang Mining & New Energy
Co.; (3) RINO International Corporation; (4) Advanced Refractive
Technologies, Inc.; (5) HiEnergy Technologies, Inc.; and (6) Digital Youth
Network Corp.116 The SEC cited its reasons for suspension in each case,
principal among them were the inaccuracy and incompleteness of
financial information, failure to make periodic listing filings, failure to
disclose independent auditors, and resignation of auditors after reports of
financial fraud.117 The SEC has also revoked the securities registration
of several reverse merger China-based corporations for failure to make
important periodic filings to U.S. investors.118 Between March and
December 2012, thirty Chinese firms had their auditors resign and twenty
were delisted by the SEC,119 certainly with more accounting issues on
the horizon. From the perspective of the SEC and agitated shareholders,
it is becoming increasingly clear that Chinese corporations are seeking
out and exploiting U.S. markets and investors in order to financially
benefit at their expense.
B. Exploitation by Chinese Corporations
A systematic, detailed look into recent judgments by courts in various
jurisdictions, including those in New York, Delaware, and California, as
well as China’s trade secrets law and policy of judgment recognition,
serves to present the steps each China-based company takes in order to
exploit investors and evade judicial reproach. First, the Central District
of California aptly illustrates a reverse merger operation and consequent
U.S. listing by China Agritech, Inc., which resulted in a class action
lawsuit under the Securities Exchange Act.120 Second, the Southern
District of New York reveals the difficulty for such class actions against
China-based corporations to even survive a motion to dismiss,121 and an
inspection of China’s trade secrets law highlights the difficulty in
obtaining the requisite evidence to have a well-pled complaint. Third,
the District of Delaware, in two separate cases, demonstrates the fraudulent
schemes and misrepresentation emblematic of the exploitative U.S.
listed, China-based companies.122 Fourth, the Eastern District of New
York in Securities and Exchange Commission v. China Energy, presents

116. Securities & Exchange Commission, Investor Bulletin, supra note 7.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Baldwin & Aubin, supra note 3.
120. See Dean v. China Agritech, Inc., 2011 WL 5148598 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
121. See In re China Life Sec. Litig., 2008 WL 4066919 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
122. See Vandevelde v. China Natural Gas, Inc., 2011 WL 2580676 (D. Del. 2011);
see also In re Heckmann, 869 F. Supp. 2d 519.
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an instructive judgment against a Chinese corporation and the available
legal remedies.123 Finally, an examination of China’s civil procedure law,
recognition policy, and absence of a bilateral treaty with the United States
elucidates the barriers to remedial enforcement.
1. The Reverse Merger Loophole
The Chinese corporations targeted by the SEC and beleaguered
shareholders typically access U.S. exchanges through the state reverse
merger process.124 In the currently ongoing case in the Central District
of California, Dean v. China Agritech, plaintiff investors brought a class
action under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act against such a
corporation, China Agritech, a holding company based out of Beijing,
China.125 Agritech is emblematic of the typical Chinese company entering
U.S. securities markets under reverse merger laws.
China Agritech is incorporated in Delaware, but manufactures and
distributes organic compound fertilizers for agricultural uses in China.126
Agritech became a publicly traded company through the reverse merger
financial technique, merging with a publicly traded shell company in
2005 and offering its stock on the NASDAQ stock exchange.127 Plaintiffs,
five individual investors who purchased Agritech stock, alleged four
claims of financial fraud in this case: (1) Agritech materially misstated
its net revenue and income for the third quarter of 2009 on its SEC Form
10-Q filing; (2) Agritech materially misstated its net revenue and income
for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 in its 2009 SEC Form 10-K filing; (3)
Agritech’s managers and Crowe Horwath, LLP (Agritech’s independent
auditor) concealed subsidiary and third-party supplier transactions; and
(4) Agritech’s managers filed a registration statement in 2010 with the
SEC in anticipation of public offering, incorporating false financial
statements for fiscal years 2008 and 2009.128
Agritech’s financial filings inflated 2008 and 2009 revenues by 1,444%
and 900%, respectively,129 and a subsequent report by independent research
group Lucas McGee Research illustrated the dearth of production by its
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See China Energy Sav. Tech., 636 F. Supp. 2d 199.
LaCroix, supra note 1.
Dean, 2011 WL 5148598 at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
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factories in China.130 The Lucas report also highlighted the substantial
discrepancy between levels of net revenue in Agritech’s filings with the
Chinese State Administration for Industry and Commerce and the SEC.131
As a result of this report, Agritech’s stock declined by a significant
percentage and plaintiffs then brought the abovementioned securities
action.132 In bypassing “certain regulatory requirements” to access U.S.
private equity markets,133 Agritech’s practices demonstrate how Chinese
companies take “unfair and improper advantage of aspects of the reverse
merger process” in order to conceal their true financial conditions and
swindle U.S. investors.134
The court in Dean ruled, in its preliminary judgment, that China
Agritech’s motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted was denied.135 In discussing
the claims under the Securities Exchange Act, the court found ample
evidence of financial fraud using the independent Lucas McGee Research
report on China Agritech in conjunction with its SEC filings.136 While
defendants suggested that differences in Chinese and U.S. accounting
principles were the source of the financial inconsistencies, the evidence
in the Lucas report was sufficiently compelling to find fraudulent intent
on the pleadings.137
2. FRCP 12(b)(6) Failure to State a Claim
In assessing whether slighted investors have an actionable fraud claim
under the Securities Exchange Act, however, a court often does not have
access to such independent, detailed, and dispositive reports during the
pleading stage. Accordingly, many of the securities claims against these
China-based companies are denied as a result of preliminary motions to
dismiss.138 While, illustratively, the Southern District of New York
dismissed such a securities action for failure to state an adequate claim,139 a
meticulous look at China’s trade secrets law explains the recurrent
absence of compelling facts needed to survive a 12(b)(6) motion.
In In re China Life Securities Litigation, plaintiff investors brought a
class action claim under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
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See In re China Life Sec. Litig., 2008 WL 4066919 at *7.
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against China Life Insurance Company Limited and its officers.140 China
Life offered its stock on the New York Stock Exchange and filed its
financial information with the SEC in 2003.141 A year earlier, China’s
National Audit Office (“NAO”), which is the Chinese government’s
highest-level audit institution, began auditing the historical finances of
China Life and found the company, prior to its restructuring as China Life,
had committed wrongdoing and ordered negligible financial sanctions.142
Subsequently, the SEC itself opened an investigation of accounting
irregularities pertaining to China Life.143
As a result of these regulatory investigations, China Life’s stock fell
just as Bloomberg News and Xinhua Financial Network News publicized
reports detailing substantial misappropriation of funds in billions of
Yuan, as well as other illegal activities.144 Once the stock price fell,
plaintiffs alleged that China Life engaged in fraudulent misrepresentation
by not disclosing accounting irregularities found by NAO, as well as the
SEC inquiry itself.145 Further, plaintiffs alleged that such misrepresentation
by China Life prior to restructuring affected the current China Life
corporation and inflated stock prices.146 The court in the Southern
District of New York granted China Life’s motion to dismiss, because it
found no misrepresentation of the NAO audit and no compounding
fraudulent denials about the SEC inquiry.147 The court further suggested
that since the SEC had not ascertained any accounting documents, the
SEC had dropped its inquiry.148 It based its decision on the fact that the
stock price rose after NAO disclosure, no connection between NAO
disclosures and the new China Life, and reliance on China Life’s own
assertion that it was unaware of any SEC inquiry.149
The court found that no “loss causation” had occurred,150 and it dismissed
the claim before even reaching a discussion of the higher plausibility
standard for “scienter” established in Tellabs.151 Accordingly, In re China
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

See id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *5.
See id.
See id.
See Tellabs, 551 U.S. 308.
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Life highlights the difficulty shareholders face in obtaining the information
necessary for a well-pled derivative complaint. As Mimi Justice, head
of Deloitte’s forensic and dispute practice in Orange County, California,
stated at a recent conference, “[Chinese executives] believe they should
not have to respond if they feel any request is too intrusive and believe
that they can tell the SEC no.”152 Such an attitude limits the effectiveness
of any investigation into a China-based company’s knowledge and intent,
as well as any resulting securities claim.153
However, the attitude of Chinese executives and the ensuing scarcity
of dispositive information can be attributed to the laws of their home
country. China’s State Secrets Law effectively shrouds much of the
substantive information about Chinese state-run organizations,154 akin to
NAO and China Life,155 as well as the private Chinese accounting and
financial paperwork necessary for SEC and shareholder derivative
claims.156 As a result, not only do claimants face the preliminary motions
due to lack of evidence, but they also may be frustrated in compelling
discovery through FRCP 37157 during the litigation process.
China’s State Secrets Law pressures ethnic Chinese with foreign
citizenship and Chinese nationals into not sharing information with
foreign businesses or governments “out of a fear of arrest.”158 Indubitably,
the Revised form of the 1989 State Secrets Law contains a broad and
uncertain classification of what constitutes a state secret.159 The Revised
Law lists policy decisions, national defense and armed forces, foreign
relations, national economic and social development, science and
technology, and state security and criminal offenses that harm “state
security and national interests” as categories of state secrets.160 However, it
also provides a “catch-all provision” to extend criminal liability to “other
secret matters” determined by the “department administering and managing
the protection of state secrets.”161 This vague classification is coupled
with severe criminal penalties ranging from five years in prison to the
death penalty, with all related proceedings being held closed to the
public.162 A particularly egregious example of the application of this
law is in the case of Xue Feng, an American citizen who was convicted
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
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and sentenced to eight years of imprisonment in China.163 In that case,
Mr. Feng was convicted for conveying public oil and gas information to
the U.S. through his business.164 In convicting Mr. Feng, not only did the
Chinese government determine post hoc that this information was in fact a
state secret, but it also subjected him to numerous human rights abuses,
denied him an attorney for over a year, and prevented visitation by his
family.165
In view of the broad scope and alarming nature of China’s State Secrets
Law and its enforcement,166 Chinese accounting firms and executives
often withhold financial records in fear of violating it.167 U.S. auditing
firms have experienced difficulty in obtaining bank accounts, balances,
and transactions, and have even received false information directly from
Chinese banks.168 As Alan Linning, a partner at Sidley Austin in Hong
Kong, aptly observes, “[Chinese firms and auditors] have a real dilemma
on their hands as to how to respond to the U.S. regulators when to do so
might expose them to criminal sanctions in China.”169 Consequently, many
of the U.S.-listed, China-based corporations in the U.S. may contemplate
and execute fraudulent schemes170 knowing that, out of fear, any related
evidence in China may be shielded from probing U.S. administrators and
judicial officers.
3. Securities Class Actions
Nevertheless, when enough evidence is ascertained, plausible facts are
pled,171 and jurisdiction is inevitably granted over Chinese executives,172

163. Id. at 322.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See id.
167. Aubin & Shalal-Esa, supra note 2.
168. Das, supra note 6.
169. Aubin & Shalal-Esa, supra note 2.
170. See, e.g., Dean, 2011 WL 5148598 (China Agritech misrepresented financial
status and production levels to profit and benefit director-owned third-party suppliers);
In re Heckmann, 869 F. Supp. 2d 519 (China Water executives falsified financial
information to profit and induced shareholders to approve merger absolving them of
personal liability); China Energy Sav. Tech., 636 F. Supp. 2d 199 (China Energy executives
engaged in “pump and dump” scheme in which they artificially increased stock price and
sold their shares at inflated price).
171. See, e.g., Dean, 2011 WL 5148598 (surviving a motion to dismiss based on
evidence provided by an Independent Lucas McGee Research report).
172. See infra Part I(c).
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the courts have captured and illuminated the elements of fraud and
misrepresentation by U.S.-listed, China-based corporations against their
shareholder victims.173 Recently, the District Court of Delaware, once in
a brief preliminary memorandum order,174 and again in a more exhaustive
opinion,175 illustrated the basic elements of fraud continually perpetrated
by Chinese companies under the Securities Exchange Act.
In Vandevelde v. China Natural Gas, plaintiff shareholders filed a
securities class action against China Natural Gas, Inc., a natural gas
pipeline provider in China that is publicly traded in the United States.176
Plaintiffs alleged that China Natural Gas misclassified in an SEC filing,
and then subsequently failed to disclose, a debt restructuring from longterm to short-term liabilities.177 When China Natural Gas failed to
disclose any financial information about the debt restructuring in a late
press release, its stock price declined substantially, and the shareholders
filed this class action under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act.178 At the very least, Vandevelde describes the type of fraudulent
misrepresentation by China-based corporations that is actionable under
Section 10(b) and SEC Regulation 10(b)-5.
In In re Heckmann Securities Litigation, plaintiff shareholders also
brought a claim under Section 10(b) alleging fraud and material
misrepresentation.179 However, the intricate scheme devised by China
Water and Drinks, Inc. demonstrates just how diabolical and dangerous
Chinese executives may be in manipulating and defrauding U.S.
investors.180 In Heckmann, China Water set out to merge with the
Heckmann Corporation, a company incorporated in Delaware looking to
acquire an operating company for its shareholders.181 China Water
manufactures and distributes bottled water products in China.182 Plaintiffs
allege that China Water and Heckmann Corporation misrepresented
China Water’s financial condition in its merger agreement with the SEC,
and fraudulently coaxed shareholders into approving the merger in order
to profit and absolve themselves of any previous liability.183
The criminal activities of Heckmann Corporation, China Water, and
its chief executive, Xu Hong Bing, are noteworthy, especially in light of
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
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the SEC’s registration statement form filed in 2008. Heckmann
Corporation filed a registration statement form for the proposed merger
with China Water.184 In that form, several risk factors about China Water
were disclosed: (1) China Water could not maintain effective controls
over internal auditing and financial statements; (2) extensive due diligence
by Credit Suisse could not identify all material issues with China Water;
and (3) the acquisition of China Water could negatively affect Heckmann
Corporation’s stock, net worth, image, and could potentially force the
company to write-down assets.185 Regardless, Heckmann filed a joint proxy
with the SEC recommending the China Water merger to its shareholders.186
Five months after shareholders approved the merger, Xu resigned and
received windfall stock gains.187 Then, the company issued its financial
results for the first quarter and disclosed significant financial inconsistencies
and China Water’s extreme debt and incapacity, leading to massive
shareholder loss.188 China Water’s executives had been reporting a separate
set of financial numbers to Chinese officials and the SEC, respectively.189
In addition, Xu falsified his educational and employment history, his
name, and was, in fact, a convicted felon.190 As a result, China Water’s
misinformation campaign financially devastated Heckmann shareholders,191
and represents the scope of fraudulent exploitation of U.S. private citizens
achievable by Chinese corporations in U.S. equity markets.
4. Securities and Exchange Commission v. China Energy
Savings Technology, Inc.
The U.S. government, acting through the SEC in its administrative
capacity, has also commenced its own securities actions to stem this
upsurge in fraudulent activity. Principal amongst these actions is Securities
and Exchange Commission v. China Energy, in which the SEC alleged
that China Energy, in cooperation with other third-party actors, engaged
in a “pump and dump” scheme of artificially inflating stock prices in

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 528.
Id. at 528–29.
Id. at 529.
Id. at 530.
Id.
Id. at 531.
Id.
See id. at 530.
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order to profit.192 While China Energy’s unlawful securities activity is
another typical example of Chinese exploitation, the Eastern District
Court of New York’s description and subsequent application of the SEC’s
available court remedies is particularly instructive.193
In the case, China Energy entered U.S. stock markets through a
reverse merger with a Nevada shell corporation, Rim Holdings, which
was owned by the other third-party defendants.194 China Energy’s principal
business involved “developing, marketing, distributing and manufacturing
energy saving products” for commercial and industrial use in China.195
For a short period after market entry, China Energy and the other
defendants artificially increased the price of China Energy stock through
a series of sham transactions between them.196 As a result, China Energy’s
stock rose from $12 to $28 per share, at which time defendants sold
millions of shares for a windfall gain.197 Subsequently, the NASDAQ
suspended trading in China Energy stock, China Energy announced the
“mass resignation of its officers and directors” to the SEC, and disconnected
all phone lines and returned all mail as undeliverable.198
As China Energy and the third-party defendants did not respond to the
complaint or otherwise appear before the judge, the court entered a
default judgment for the SEC.199 Accordingly, the court could bypass
the preliminary evidentiary issues because all allegations of liability in
the complaint were deemed true in default.200 As a result, the SEC
sought an order utilizing various court remedies including: (1) permanent
injunctions; (2) disgorgement of unlawful profits; and (3) appropriate
civil remedies under the Securities Exchange Act.201 The SEC also
sought a preliminary injunction to freeze the assets of defendants located
in the U.S., as alleged in the complaint.202
First, the SEC sought to enjoin defendants from future securities
violations and from acting as a director or officer in any capacity.203 For
potential future securities violations, the court has broad discretion to

192. China Energy Sav. Tech., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 199–200.
193. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. China Energy Sav. Tech., Inc., 2008 WL 6572372
(E.D.N.Y. 2008).
194. China Energy Sav. Tech., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 200.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 200–01.
198. China Energy Sav. Tech., Inc., 2008 WL 6572372 at *5.
199. See id.
200. Id. at *6; see Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L. U.L. Realty Corp., 973
F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992).
201. See id.
202. China Energy Sav. Tech., 636 F. Supp. 2d at 201.
203. China Energy Sav. Tech., Inc., 2008 WL 6572372 at *7.
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award an injunction after considering four factors: “(1) the degree of
scienter involved; (2) the isolated or recurring nature of the fraudulent
activity; (3) the defendant’s appreciation of his wrongdoing; and (4) the
defendant’s opportunities to commit future violations.”204 In China
Energy’s case, the company engaged in systematic wrongdoing, failed to
provide assurances against future violations to the SEC, and failed to
acknowledge its wrongdoing.205 Accordingly, China Energy and the
individual defendants were permanently restrained from securities
violations directly or indirectly.206 For the officer and director bar, the
court has broad discretion to award an injunction after considering six
factors: “(1) the ‘egregiousness’ of the underlying securities law
violation; (2) the defendant’s ‘repeat offender’ status; (3) the defendant’s
‘role’ or position when he engaged in the fraud; (4) the defendant’s
degree of scienter; (5) the defendant’s economic stake in the violation;
and (6) the likelihood that misconduct will recur.”207 In China Energy’s
case, the individual defendants engaged in fraud and deceit in their
capacity as executives and were consequently restrained from holding
any director position for a public securities issuer.208
Second, the SEC sought to disgorge profits in accounts controlled by
defendants in the amount of $50,755,892.04.209 Once federal security
law violations have been found, the court has broad discretion to order
disgorgement of wrongful profits.210 In addition, the court has broad
discretion to further award prejudgment interest on the amount disgorged.211
In China Energy’s case, the court could determine only that $29,665,625.28
located in certain specific bank accounts was a result of the illegitimate,
criminal conduct.212 Further, the court awarded $3,652,554.34 to be
disgorged by defendants as prejudgment interest.213
204. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Softpoint, 958 F. Supp. 846, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1997);
China Energy Sav. Tech., Inc., 2008 WL 6572372 at *7; see also Sec. & Exch. Comm’n
v. Bonastia, 614 F.2d 908, 912 (3d Cir. 1980); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Universal Major
Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1976) (citations omitted).
205. China Energy Sav. Tech., Inc., 2008 WL 6572372 at *8.
206. Id.
207. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 1995); China Energy
Sav. Tech., Inc., 2008 WL 6572372 at *9.
208. China Energy Sav. Tech., Inc., 2008 WL 6572372 at *9.
209. Id. at *10.
210. Id.
211. Id. at *12–13.
212. Id. at *12.
213. Id. at *17.
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Third, the SEC sought to level civil penalties against defendants for
fraudulent actions causing millions of dollars in China Energy investor
losses.214 Congress enacted the civil penalties as a further financial
disincentive to engage in securities fraud, and the court has discretion to
determine said penalties in light of the circumstances of the case.215 In
China Energy’s case, the court assessed civil penalties totaling $1,075,000
against various defendants.216
Finally, the SEC moved for a preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order (“TRO”) to freeze the assets of defendants.217 In
support of the motion, the SEC produced evidence that conclusively
showed funds located in accounts in the U.S. directly traceable to the
fraudulent proceeds.218 Accordingly, the court entered the TRO against
defendants, limiting the asset freeze to the “disposition, transfer, or
dissipation of any proceeds from the sale of China Energy stock.”219
Using all of the abovementioned methods, the SEC made a concerted
effort, through traditional court remedies, to hold executives and related
parties to China Energy’s fraudulent activity.220 Moreover, while there
has yet to be a reported case where criminal liability has been imposed
on Chinese executives pursuant to SOX, criminal conviction may also be
an additional court remedy for fraudulent activity through SEC
misrepresentation.221 However, even in the face of evidentiary findings,
consequent court judgments, federal corporate and securities law, and
U.S. administrative action, Chinese corporations continue to unabashedly
exploit U.S. shareholders.222
5. China’s Barriers to Enforcement
Conspicuously, U.S.-listed, China-based companies’ recklessness with
regard to U.S. securities law can be attributed to the fact that Chinese
courts do not enforce U.S. judgments.223 Furthermore, China and the
U.S. are not currently parties to a bilateral criminal extradition treaty, so
China is under no obligation to extradite a Chinese national to the U.S.
pursuant to any U.S. criminal conviction.224 Consequently, a closer look at
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
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Chinese civil procedure law, as well as the state of U.S.-China criminal
cooperation, may serve to illuminate the logical impetus behind the
continuing fraudulent activity by Chinese executives.
Initially, U.S. judgments have virtually no force or effect in Chinese
courts under China’s domestic law and policy.225 The Civil Procedure
Law of the PRC of 1991, Articles 267 and 268, outline the standards and
rules for enforcement of foreign judgments by Chinese courts.226 However,
the law has proven quite dubious and uncertain.227 These provisions allow
Chinese courts to review recognition of judgments on the merits and enforce
recognition of judgments based on reciprocity. The Law does not specify
circumstances under which Chinese courts may refuse to enforce foreign
judgments and provides a “catch-all” ground for non-recognition where
enforcement would be contrary to “state sovereignty, security, and/or public
policy.”228 Additionally, since Chinese courts rarely publish decisions,
there is a lack of empirical evidence as to the effectiveness or interpretation
of any of these terms,229 which leads to further prospects of nonrecognition. Moreover, Chinese courts’ “parochial protection of Chinese
parties,” as well as other factors, such as “the lack of judicial independence
in China, the prevalence of local protectionism, the unimaginable social
consequences of bankrupting state-owned enterprises, the paucity of
necessary legal provisions curbing debtor fraud and facilitating judgment
collection, and the lack of understanding of and conceptual conflict
between the Chinese and U.S. legal systems,” render U.S. judgment
enforcement in China practically nonexistent.230
Pertinently, the enforcement of U.S. judgments in China directly
impacts whether Chinese nationals choose to violate U.S. securities law.
Concededly, in China Energy, the Eastern District Court of New York
found for the SEC in its judgment requiring the defendants to disgorge
upwards of $34,000,000 in wrongful and fraudulent profits.231 However,
225. See generally Clarke, supra note 16.
226. Carolyn B. Lamm, Chiara Giorgetti & Jiamie Chen, Enforcement of U.S./
Canadian Judgments and Arbitral Awards in China, WHITE & CASE LLP, at 4 (2010),
http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.
cfm&ContentID=4991.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 6–7.
229. Id. at 5.
230. Arthur Anyuan Yuan, Enforcing and Collecting Money Judgments in China
from a U.S. Judgment Creditor’s Perspective, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 757, 759
(2004).
231. See supra notes 211–18 and accompanying text.
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as Chinese courts typically do not enforce U.S. judgments, close to
$30,000,000 will not be recovered by the SEC or the United States
government.232 While $4,000,000 will be recovered pursuant to the
preliminary motion for a TRO freezing assets located in the U.S.,233
China Energy executives and third-party defendants may conceivably
travel back home to China with a handsome surplus, courtesy of victimized
U.S. investors. For all practical purposes, then, it seems no civil remedial
enforcement mechanism exists as a disincentive or consequence to
fraudulent securities activity.
Second, no potential criminal liability serves as a disincentive for
Chinese executives contemplating exploitation of U.S. equity markets,
due to a lack of both a bilateral extradition treaty and the prospect of
cooperative state efforts. Currently, no extradition treaty exists between
the two countries primarily because of the U.S.’s insistence on China’s
improvement in human rights, public corruption and the rule of law.234
While China has expressed a desire to enter into a treaty with the U.S.,
until a significant Chinese social policy overhaul, the advantages of
“regularity, clarity, and predictability” in extradition will be absent from
the current “case-by-case approach.”235
Encouragingly, there have been instances of cross-border cooperation
between the U.S. and China regarding financial criminal activity.236 In a
case involving the Bank of China, managers embezzled $485,000,000
from the Bank of China and laundered the money into the U.S. through
casino accounts.237 When one of the managers was convicted of
racketeering in the U.S., he spent twelve years in jail and then was
extradited to China for further incarceration.238 In a case involving
Randolph Guthrie, an international DVD piracy kingpin, Guthrie was
arrested in Shanghai pursuant to a joint U.S.-China investigation, and
then extradited to the U.S. for sentencing.239 However, the distinguishing
characteristic in both of these cases was how decidedly advantageous the
outcomes were to both the U.S. and China.240 Absent a bilateral
extradition treaty, the case-by-case approach proves to be much more
limited for traditional criminal conduct in each country.241 Significantly,
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where political, economic, religious or social matters complicate a criminal
conviction, collaboration between the countries or state agencies may be
even more strained.242
Here, a criminal conviction for securities fraud by Chinese nationals in
the U.S. not only benefits the U.S. exclusively, but it also involves
sensitive socio-political and economic interests. Accordingly, no instances
of criminal extradition pursuant to federal SOX legislation seem likely
under these circumstances. As attorney Phillip Kim explains, “If you’re a
CEO of a company based in China and sign a false Sarbanes-Oxley
certification, it’s very difficult for the U.S. government or Justice
Department to charge you with that crime, indict you and bring you to
justice.”243 Furthermore, some Chinese executives resist answering to
U.S. authorities at all.244 While SOX legislation applies to any company
that sells securities in U.S. markets, whether they are based in the U.S.
or another country, “few Chinese executives fear being led away in
handcuffs because of the lack of an extradition treaty.”245 Accordingly,
the SOX legislation does nothing to deter Chinese companies in the same
way that it deters domestic accounting misconduct by criminalizing
financial misrepresentation.246
C. What Needs to Change
In view of the gross violations perpetrated by these foreign corporations,
as well as the international and domestic impediments to judicial reproach,
the U.S. government must realize that its legislative regulatory power is
diminishing in the global marketplace. Transnational corporations are now
the major players in world trade, and foreign direct investment has been
steadily increasing, most notably in developed countries.247 The growing
economic interdependence of the world’s economies is demonstrated by
the growing importance of transnational companies investments and the
significance of private investment for developed nations,248 such as the

242. Id.
243. Aubin & Shalal-Esa, supra note 2.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report
1995 (New York 1995), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/wir1995overview_en.pdf.
248. Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic
Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 721 (2002).
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U.S. Moreover, these foreign companies are increasingly tempted to
engage in foreign corruption absent any civil or criminal liability. 249 In
this increasingly volatile, global corporate environment, Congress and state
legislatures need to address these private and public regulatory issues with
Chinese companies, while also charting a broader path toward international
commercial accountability.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
To solve the immediate problem of U.S.-listed, China-based companies’
exploitation of U.S. investors, federal and state governments must work
together under a two-pronged approach. First, the U.S. government should
engage in a proactive diplomatic policy with China to make accounting
and other such practices more transparent, move toward a bilateral
extradition treaty, provide political and legal pressure to relax trade secret
laws in litigation, and promote flexibility. Second, the U.S. should engage
in a more protectionist domestic economic policy. For instance, Congress
should pass a bond requirement for foreign-based corporations entering
U.S. securities markets and state legislatures should require a more stringent
registration process for foreign-based reverse mergers. The federal
government should also seek to lower the corporate tax rate to counter
these additional regulations and incentivize lawful foreign investment.
As a result, this two-pronged approach may serve as a model for solving
future foreign-based corporate accountability issues.
A. International Diplomacy and Pressure
Preliminarily, the U.S. should open up diplomatic channels with China
while also promoting a more transparent and flexible corporate foreign
policy. Specifically, the U.S. should look to the 2007 E.U. Directive on
Shareholders’ Rights (“E.U. Directive”) as a guide.250 Furthermore, the
SEC should engage with the China Securities Regulatory Commission
(“CSRC”), the SEC’s Chinese counterpart,251 to formally assess corporate
regulations and solutions, similar to the 2008 SEC pilot mutual recognition
program with Australia.252 Moreover, the federal government should put
political and legal pressure on China during this type of international
litigation as the U.S. and the IRS did during the Swiss UBS litigation
249. See Philip M. Nichols, Colloquy: Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times
of Globalization and Fragmentation, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 257, 272–73 (1999).
250. Jennifer G. Hill, Regulatory Show and Tell: Lessons from International Statutory
Regimes, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 826–27 (2008).
251. See Aubin & Shalal-Esa, supra note 2.
252. Hill, supra note 250, at 842–43.
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saga.253 Finally, the U.S. should make strides toward a bilateral extradition
treaty or increase further step-by-step cross-border cooperation for corporate
criminal prosecutions.
First, China’s corporate access to operation in U.S. securities markets
must be more transparent and flexible to protect U.S. shareholders.
Pertinently, the E.U. Directive addressed corporate scandals in a “crossborder context” with respect to European capital markets.254 It contained
reforms designed to strengthen shareholder rights, promote flexibility,
and increase standards of transparency and accountability in the E.U.
without burdening over-regulation.255 While these reforms addressed
current shareholder obstacles between European nations, the U.S. could
apply these transparency and flexibility principles in a similar directive
with China.
Second, the SEC should more effectively coordinate with the CSRC to
address reporting regulations, conflicts of corporate laws, and promote
cooperation between the U.S. and China. In 2008, the SEC entered into
a pilot mutual recognition program with Australian corporate regulator
ASIC in order to assess each other’s regulatory system and determine
appropriate levels of investor protection.256 The SEC should look to
engage in a similar program with the CSRC to find solutions to root out
corporate fraud both in the U.S. and in China.
Third, during the inevitable securities litigation against U.S.-listed,
China-based corporations, the U.S. should put political and legal pressure
on China to relax the China State Secrets laws when U.S. investors are
directly injured. As in the Swiss tax-evasion litigation,257 U.S. government
officials should meet with Chinese officials to settle differences and
relax applicable trade secrets laws that prohibit the necessary discovery
in corporate securities litigation.
Finally, while a bilateral criminal extradition treaty with China is
unlikely absent significant Chinese social reform,258 the U.S. must continue
to build on the step-by-step approach for criminal extradition with China.259
253. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.
254. Hill, supra note 250, at 827.
255. Id.
256. Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Chairman Cox,
Prime Minister Rudd Meet Amid U.S.-Australia Mutual Recognition Talks (Mar. 29,
2008), available at www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-52.htm.
257. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.
258. MacCormack, supra note 68, at 446.
259. Id. at 467–70.
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These instances of cooperation for financial criminal activity260 are
encouraging and the U.S. must properly articulate to Chinese officials
why mutual law enforcement cooperation benefits both the U.S. and China.
B. Protectionist Domestic Economic Policy
Next, the U.S. should look inward and promote a more protectionist
domestic economic policy. This requires a concerted effort by both the
U.S. Congress and state legislatures to combat investor exploitation by
these U.S.-listed, China-based corporations. On the federal level, Congress
should pass a bond requirement for foreign-based corporations to place a
certain amount of investment assets in the U.S. At the state level, the
U.S. should encourage state legislatures to require more stringent
requirements narrowly tailored for reverse mergers by foreign-based
corporations. Furthermore, Congress should consider lowering corporate
tax rates to counter these additional requirements and to encourage
lawful foreign investment.
First, Congress should pass a bond requirement for foreign-based
corporations, specifically those merging or buying a subsidiary in the
U.S. and entering U.S. securities markets, in order for the SEC and courts to
have access to assets in the event of litigation. As in the China Energy
litigation, the SEC or securities plaintiffs would be able to freeze or
attach these assets when litigation begins. The assets would only be
required in the U.S. for a limited time period, or until determination of
lawful accounting practices. Accordingly, this bond would provide some
restitution for the SEC and aggrieved U.S. investors, and it would bypass
many issues with regard to China’s non-enforcement of U.S. judgments.
Second, state legislatures should enact narrowly tailored, stringent
requirements for foreign-based reverse mergers in their respective states.
Since the SEC and the federal government cannot root out every
exploitative corporation,261 the states have the responsibility to take steps
to prevent easy access to U.S. securities exchanges through state corporate
law.
Finally, to combat these additional regulations and disincentives, the
U.S. Congress should consider lowering the corporate tax rates to
incentivize foreign investment. The U.S. corporate tax rate is one of the
highest in the world. 262 As such, lowering corporate tax rates may

260.
261.
262.

Id.
See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.
Scott A. Hodge, Lower Corporate Tax Rates: A Win-Win for Everyone,
INVESTORS.COM (Feb. 17, 2011), http://news.investors.com/Article/563517/20110217
1732/Low-Corporate-Tax-Rates-A-Win-Win-For-Everyone.htm.
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“encourage inbound foreign direct investment.”263 Accordingly, while
the U.S. needs to protect itself and its investors from the exploitative
Chinese corporation through protective regulations, the U.S. still needs
lawful foreign investment to make the economy grow in this global
marketplace.
C. Conclusion
China-based corporations have been exploiting U.S. investors through
fraudulent, manipulative schemes, while hiding behind a veil of trade
secrets laws, criminal impunity, and non-enforcement of judgments.
However, the U.S. federal and state governments may, and should, take
proactive steps to make international corporate activities more transparent
and flexible, and consequently hold these Chinese companies accountable.
While the increasingly global economy poses many domestic dangers,
cooperative and coordinated action by all levels of government may
protect U.S. investors not only from these China-based companies, but
also from any exploitative foreign corporation in the future.

263.

Id.
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